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ABSTRACT
The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means (1932) remains one of the most cited works in
management studies. Our paper shows that Berle and Means espoused a
stakeholder theory of corporate governance that challenged the thenhegemonic idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is to create value for
the shareholders. We argue that Berle and Means’s support for stakeholder
theory can be associated with their earlier service in the U.S. military, an
organization which then inculcated an ethos of public service in its
members. Our paper, which is based on archival research in the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, seeks to relate changes in how U.S.
military organizations have structured themselves with contemporaneous
changes in the organization of private-sector firms.
INTRODUCTION
This paper will advance our understanding of the evolution of U.S.
ideologies of corporate governance by examining the circumstances that
surrounded the writing of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. Other researchers have argued that
this influential book promoted “managerialism,” the philosophy of
corporate governance that dominated U.S. business life from the 1930s to
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the 1970s.1 Managerialism held that executives ought to take the interests
of a wide range of stakeholders, not just shareholders, into account when
making decisions.2 Managerialism was different from both post-1980
shareholder-value ideology and the philosophy that informed U.S.
corporate governance prior to the New Deal: from roughly the 1830s to
the 1930s, the dominant view in the United States was that business
corporations existed solely to maximize shareholder value.3 According to
scholars such as Roger Martin and Lynn Stout, the rise of managerialism
around the time of the New Deal encouraged a generation of U.S.
managers to share the benefits of rising productivity with workers. The
result was a remarkable period of shared prosperity in the thirty or so years
after 1945.4 Martin, Stout, and other authors have connected the welldocumented post-1980 rise in levels of income inequality in the United
States to the displacement of Berle–Means managerialism by the renascent
ideology of shareholder value.5
Why does our re-examination of Berle, Means, and their book
matter? The research discussed in the previous paragraphs suggests why
the study of business ideas and business books can be important: most
business books have zero influence on the real world, but some texts, of
which The Modern Corporation and Private Property is a prime example,
do help to change the prevailing ideology of corporate governance, thereby
changing millions of lives.
Ideas have consequences. In view of the importance of this text to
the history of American business in the twentieth century, it is surely
worthy to investigate the motives of its authors. It is hoped that our paper
will be read by legal scholars, corporate governance researchers, business
1. See generally ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT
CAPITALISM CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL (2011); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy,
Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169 (2013);
Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle
of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305 (2012).
2. ARCHIE B. CARROLL ET AL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
137–38, 187–91, 199–220 (Kenneth E. Goodpaster ed., 2012).
3. Robert E. Wright, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Rise of the Non-Profit Sector in
America, in A HISTORY OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS, C. 1600–1950, at 117, 121 (William
Pettigrew & David Smith eds., 2017); Evelyn Atkinson, The “People’s Bridge”: Popular Sovereignty
and the Charles River Bridge Case (Stigler Ctr. for the Study of the Econ. and the State, Working
Paper No. 25, 2018).
4. See MARC LEVINSON, AN EXTRAORDINARY TIME: THE END OF THE POSTWAR BOOM AND
THE RETURN OF THE ORDINARY ECONOMY (2016).
5. J. Adam Cobb, How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power, Executive Decision
Making, and the Structuring of Employment Relationships, 41 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 324 (2016); see
Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005).
See generally William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology
for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000).
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historians, and other academics. Moreover, we are convinced that the rediscovery of the philosophy of Berle and Means is of genuine social
importance. Therefore, we hope to raise awareness of the more radical
aspects of their ideas among thoughtful practitioners to encourage
reflection on the excesses of the post-1980 period of shareholder primacy.
Some readers may be skeptical of our claim that the ideas of Berle
and Means are still relevant. We concede that there are many differences
between our time and the context in which Berle and Means wrote, in
which the Managerial Revolution (i.e., the transformation of the American
economy by the rise of the large oligopolistic corporations managed by
non-proprietor managers) was then a very recent phenomenon.6 Today, we
are used to the dominance of many industries by a few firms owned by
absentee shareholders.7 The lengthy sections of the book by Berle and
Means devoted to explaining such then-novel phenomena as the separation
of management and control therefore strike the twenty-first century reader
as both superfluous and quaint. We are nevertheless convinced that the
prescriptive ideas of Berle and Means are highly relevant to today’s
debates about inequality, corporate governance, and the social
responsibilities of companies. Berle and Means tackled what is still the
most important question in corporate governance: In whose interests
should for-profit corporations be managed? At a time when many
Americans are once again debating issues related to corporate governance,
executive compensation, and whether managers have duties beyond
maximizing returns for shareholders, we believe that an exploration of the
historical origins of Berle and Means’s seminal text is timely.8 Indeed, reengaging with Berle and Means’s call for business executives to behave in
a public-spirited fashion is particularly important in the light of the
emergence of political movements and national leaders who
simultaneously celebrate the robust pursuit of self-interest in business
contexts while claiming to honor the public-service ethos of members of
the military.
We now progress to a literature review which looks at how previous
authors have viewed the motives of Berle and Means before detailing how
the project to write The Modern Corporation and Private Property took
shape. We argue that Berle and Means’s military service influenced their
6. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1977).
7. Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More
Concentrated? (Apr. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/138f/
249c43bfec315227a242b305b9764d57a0af.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DKJ-6F6W].
8. JEROEN VELDMAN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT OF
A GLOBAL ROUNDTABLE SERIES (2016); Thomas M. Jones & Will Felps, Shareholder Wealth
Maximization and Social Welfare: A Utilitarian Critique, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 207 (2013).

538

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:535

thinking. We discuss the reception and impact of the book and then
consider how and why the influence of the book declined after around
1970 as Chicago School ideas came to influence U.S. corporate
governance, displacing Berle–Means managerialism. We show that the
result was a resurgence of the shareholder primacy principle that Berle and
Means opposed. We conclude our paper by arguing that the book remains
highly relevant today, when Americans are once again debating whether
the business corporation has any purpose besides the maximization of
shareholder value.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE MOTIVES OF BERLE AND MEANS
The existing literature on the rise and fall of managerialism has
clearly established the importance of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property in shaping U.S. business thought and practice in the
period from the 1930s to the late 1970s.9 In 1992, a distinguished legal
academic noted that The Modern Corporation and Private Property
shaped the thinking of “an entire generation.”10 Unfortunately, these
authors have neither examined the immediate context in which Berle and
Means wrote their seminal text nor reflected on the motives of the authors.
One of the few to discuss the authorial motivation behind the book is the
Marxist scholar Richard Marens, who regards the publication of The
Modern Corporation and Private Property as part of a broader Corporate
Social Responsibility movement.11 For Marens, corporate social
responsibility was a tactic used by the American corporate elite to preserve
its autonomy. This would help them resist increasing labor militancy and
growing demands for government regulation in the context of the Great
Depression.
We profoundly disagree with Marens’s cynical contention that The
Modern Corporation and Private Property and “business liberalism” more
generally was simply a defensive move by U.S. corporations to preempt
9. See generally BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2011); RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A
PROFESSION (2007); Gregory Mark, The Corporate Economy: Ideologies of Regulation and Antitrust,
1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 613 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008); MARTIN, supra note 1; William W. Bratton, Berle and Means
Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001); William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of the Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010); Stout, supra note 1; Wells, supra note 1.
10. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 166–67 (1992).
11. Richard Marens, What Comes Around: The Early 20th Century American Roots of
Legitimating Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 ORG. 454, 454–76 (2013).
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demands for more radical economic reforms. Marens overlooks the fact
that Berle and Means had an interest in the social responsibilities of
corporate managers that predates American capitalism’s existential crisis
in the winter of 1932–1933. The chronology of the manuscript’s
composition does not fit Marens’s argument, since we know from Berle’s
papers that the book was completed by 1931.12 Moreover, it is inaccurate
to describe Berle and Means as the tools of the corporate elite when
powerful business interests actually attempted to suppress the publication
of this book.
We are more sympathetic to Christian Christiansen’s view that Berle
and Means’s advocacy of a “socialized, public-oriented corporation” was
a profound challenge to the ethos of “free-market liberalism.”13 We also
agree with Howard Brick’s view that there are some affinities between the
stakeholder view presented by Berle and Means and the “war-inspired
aspirations” for “industrial or economic democracy” that led to the
creation of the “League for Industrial Democracy” in 1921.14
Indeed, we concur with Brick and see the legacy of the Great War as
crucial to our understanding of the book’s origins. During the war, which
was fought in the name of making the world safe for democracy, proposals
for workplace democracy in the form of works councils and employee
representation on boards were energetically debated in the United States
and other Entente countries. During the First World War, John D.
Rockefeller Jr. became a proponent of worker representation in corporate
governance through elected worker representatives.15 American observers,
such as Berle, observed how workers’ councils, or “soviets,” seized
control of factories in Russia in 1917.16 The Great War saw the creation of
works councils in shipyards and other U.S. workplaces. By 1922 there
were at least 725 works councils in the United States.17 Although
12. Columbia Oral History Transcript 121 (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library, Adolf Berle Papers, Box 206) [hereinafter Columbia Oral History].
13. CHRISTIAN OLAF CHRISTIANSEN, PROGRESSIVE BUSINESS: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 63 (2015).
14. HOWARD BRICK, TRANSCENDING CAPITALISM: VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY IN MODERN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 56, 62 (2006).
15. Bruce E. Kaufman, Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion Employee
Representation in the Pre-Wagner Act Years: A Reassessment, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 21, 22 (Bruce E. Kaufman &
Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000); JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE
FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912–
1921, at 54 (1997); Raymond Hogler, From Ludlow to Chattanooga and Beyond: A Century of
Employee Representation Plans and the Future of the American Labor Movement, 22 J. MGMT. HIST.
130 (2016).
16. A.A. Berle, How Labor Could Control, 28 NEW REPUBLIC 37 (1921).
17. NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., EXPERIENCE WITH WORKS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED
STATES, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 50, at 1 (1922).
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Germany, rather than the United States, would eventually become the
nation most closely associated with workplace democracy,18 our
knowledge of this subsequent development should not blind us to the fact
that interest in workplace democracy was strong in early twentieth century
America.
The Great War debate over industrial democracy, along with the
1916 to 1919 court battle between Henry Ford and his investors,19 raised
the fundamental issue of whose interests corporations ought to be
governed for: either only the shareholders or the shareholders along with
other participating stakeholders, including workers. Although Berle and
Means did not touch on the issue of the inclusion of workers in corporate
governance in their 1933 book, they shared the belief of workplace
democracy, advocating that managers had a moral obligation to consider
the interests of workers as well as shareholders in making corporate
strategy, as we show below.
We argue that the stakeholder model of corporate governance Berle
and Means presented in their book was influenced by their experiences
during the First World War. Their book represents an attempt to introduce
into the business world the ethos of professionalism and disinterested
public service that characterized the U.S. Army’s officer corps. In most
modern professional armies, the dominant ethos is one of altruism and
devotion to the national interest: individuals are expected to serve the
nation selflessly and at modest rates of pay. In the peacetime private
sector, in contrast, the profit motive is accepted, and the prevailing ethos
holds that it is legitimate for executives, shareholders, and other actors to
maximize their own economic interest. The Modern Corporation and
Private Property was an exhortation to American managers to emulate the
ethos of military officers by putting country before self and prioritizing the
interests of the nation over those of shareholders and executives.
We also argue that the Berle–Means version of stakeholder theory
was a paternalist one in which senior managers were to expect
unconditional obedience from subordinates in the same way that early
twentieth century U.S. military commanders expected soldiers to respect
the chain of command. There has long been a two-way exchange of ideas
between the corporate world and the military. At various points in its
history, the militaries of the United States and other capitalist countries
have borrowed organizational techniques developed by managers in the
18. Carola Frege, The Discourse of Industrial Democracy: Germany and the US Revisited, 26
ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 151 (2005).
19. M. Todd Henderson, “Everything Old is New Again”: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 373, 2007).
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private sector. For instance, management tools developed by civilian
railway executives coordinated Allied supply lines on the Western Front
during the First World War.20 As Shamir has shown, ideas about scientific
management taken from large U.S. companies have long influenced U.S.
military doctrine.21 This process was famously illustrated by Robert S.
McNamara’s attempt to manage the Vietnam War using techniques that
had previously worked for him at the Ford Motor Company.22 There is a
somewhat smaller body of literature on how military managerial
innovations flowed in the opposite direction, namely from the armed
forces to the private sector. For instance, the influence of the military on
the history of American management is a theme that was developed by
Keith Hoskin and Richard Macve in their study of the business careers of
graduates from the United States Military Academy, West Point, who
brought military organizational techniques into the private sector.23 While
we know about specific managerial techniques that have moved between
the military and the private sector, the impact of militarization and the
military ethos on the evolution of U.S. corporate governance remains a
woefully under-researched topic.
In his pioneering study of the displacement of managerialism by
shareholder value ideology after the 1970s, Brian Cheffins asserts that the
formative experience of military service during the Second World War
influenced the behavior of corporate executives in the 1950s and 1960s.24
For Cheffins, the replacement of this cohort by younger men who had
largely been spared military service helps to explain the rise of shareholder
value ideology in the 1980s; he writes that that the military ethos of service
to the collective was one of the “factors that helped to keep top
management on the straight and narrow during the managerial capitalism
era [i.e., between the 1930s and the 1970s] . . . . Values such as duty,
honesty, service, and responsibility that were fostered under the testing
conditions of the Great Depression and World War II likely contributed to
a sense of moral restraint among mid-twentieth-century executives.”25
Unfortunately, Cheffins did not develop this insight, which was supported

20. Christopher Phillips, Early Experiments in Civil–Military Cooperation: The South-Eastern
and Chatham Railway and the Port of Boulogne, 1914–15, 34 WAR & SOC’Y 90 (2015).
21. Eitan Shamir, The Long and Winding Road: the US Army Managerial Approach to Command
and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik), 33 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 645, 648–50 (2010).
22. Phil Rosenzweig, Robert S. McNamara and the Evolution of Modern Management, 88 HARV.
BUS. REV. 86, 86–93 (2010).
23. Keith W. Hoskin & Richard H. Macve, The Genesis of Accountability: The West Point
Connection, 13 ACCT., ORG. & SOC’Y 37 (1988).
24. Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Since the Managerial Capitalism Era, 89 BUS.
HIST. REV. 717, 723 (2015).
25. Id.
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primarily by a citation of Sobel’s celebratory history of the “Greatest
Generation.”26
The sociological term Greatest Generation, which is conventionally
applied to Americans born between 1901 and 1927, has recently appeared
in non-scholarly works that contrast the imagined virtues of this generation
with the selfishness of the Baby Boomers.27 Professor Cheffins is careful
not to romanticize U.S. corporate governance in the managerialist era,
noting that executives of the so-called Greatest Generation were
responsible for such debacles as the bankruptcy of Penn Central in 1970.28
He points out that such managerial failures ultimately served to discredit
managerialism and thus pave the way for the rise of shareholder-value
ideology.
While Cheffins prudently qualifies his comments, linking
managerialism with the Greatest Generation’s formative experience of
military service, he nevertheless associates a higher level of patriotism to
the willingness of managerialism-era managers to consider the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders.
We agree with Cheffins that there was likely a causal linkage
between the patriotism manifested in military service and the willingness
of U.S. executives of the managerialist era to subordinate the interests of
shareholders to those of workers and other stakeholders. However, we feel
that more empirical research and conceptual clarity about military
patriotism and corporate patriotism is required.
II. MILITARY SERVICE AND CULTURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
We would regard it as a serious fallacy to maintain that an executive
will be more likely to adopt an ethos of public service in a subsequent
business career than would otherwise have been the case just because that
executive once served in the uniform of some military force. In our view,
the crucial variable is the ethos that pervades the culture of the particular
military organization in which the future executive is socialized. Not all
armed forces promote service to the collective as a moral ideal, and some
militaries have organizational culture that permit the pursuit of financial
self-interest by leaders. In our view, military organizations can be placed
on a spectrum that extends from those that operate on a pure version of
agency theory, in which leaders are motivated financially, to ones in which
an altruistic desire to serve the collective (e.g., the nation-state) is
26. See ROBERT SOBEL, THE GREAT BOOM 1950–2000: HOW A GENERATION OF AMERICANS
CREATED THE WORLD’S MOST PROSPEROUS SOCIETY (2002).
27. KENNETH ROSE, MYTH AND THE GREATEST GENERATION: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II (2013).
28. Cheffins, supra note 24, at 725.
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inculcated in all members. A future executive who has served in the latter
type of military organization would be, in our view, far more likely to
believe that managers ought to prioritize the interests of the wider
community over those of themselves and the shareholders. Berle and
Means served in such a military force.
The historical record shows that armed forces have occupied
different points on this spectrum, using a mixture of material rewards (e.g.,
cash bonuses) and patriotic appeals to serve the nation to motivate
personnel to exert themselves. For instance, the Royal Navy prior to 1815
and the British Army in the pre-1868 era of purchased commissions are
outstanding historical examples of armed forces that relied heavily on
financial incentives in the course of motivating their multinational
workforces to perform risky tasks.29 In the early modern period, the use of
mercenaries with no regard to their nationality was common—the
powerful Spanish, Swedish, and French Empires of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries relied to a large extent on forces recruited from
poorer parts of Europe, including Germany, Switzerland, and the British
Isles.30 In the eighteenth century, the link between military units and
nation-states became somewhat stronger, but the careers of officers
continued to take them across borders, and buying a regiment could be a
profitable investment for a military entrepreneur. In this context, there was
often no pretense that either the officer or the ordinary soldiers were
motivated by patriotism.31 Such forces were thus similar to present-day,
for-profit military companies such as Academic (formerly Blackwater),
which also rely on financial incentives rather than patriotism to motivate
members.32
Berle and Means, in contrast, did their military service in an armed
force that had a public-spirited ethos rather than a profit-seeking one. For
context, it should be explained that in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, many countries abandoned the use of mercenaries and
financial incentives for enlistment and performance in favor of appeals
based on patriotism.33 There was a profound change in military culture and
29. Douglas W. Allen, Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of
Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 57, 65–68 (2005);
Daniel K. Benjamin & Christopher Thornberg, Organization and Incentives in the Age of Sail,
44 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 317 (2007).
30. JAN GLETE, WAR AND THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: SPAIN, THE DUTCH
REPUBLIC AND SWEDEN AS FISCAL-MILITARY STATES 6 (2002).
31. Rafael Torres-Sánchez et al., War and Economy. Rediscovering the Eighteenth-Century
Military Entrepreneur, 60 BUS. HIST. 4, 4–7 (2018).
32. Charles W. Mahoney, Buyer Beware: How Market Structure Affects Contracting and
Company Performance in the Private Military Industry, 26 SEC. STUD. 30, 50–52 (2017).
33. Deborah Avant, From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of
War, INT’L ORG., Winter 2000, at 41.
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motives for military service in all Western countries,34 with the officer
corps of Revolutionary France and Prussia being among the first in the
Western world to experience professionalization and the demise of the
older model of military leadership in which the profit motive had been
considered legitimate.35 This professional ethos became dominant in the
U.S. officer corps over the course of the nineteenth century thanks to the
efforts of U.S. military reformers who admired the professionalism and
public-service ethos of the French and Prussian officer classes.36 The result
of the efforts of these reformers was that the U.S. military promoted a noncommercial ethos that contrasted with the acceptance of the profit-motive
so evident in other spheres of American life.37 References to financial
incentives are conspicuously absent from the motto of West Point (“Duty,
Honor, Country”) created in 1802.
One of the results of the cultural shift effected by the reformers was
that U.S. military recruitment in the First World War did not rely on cash
incentives, in sharp contrast to the American Civil War. There, military
work had been structured via a quasi-market whereby rich men were able
to pay poor men to take their places.38 In a parallel development, the U.S.
military had, by the early twentieth century, dispensed with financial
incentives as a means of incentivizing officers to exert themselves on the
battlefield. The so-called “salary revolution” of the nineteenth century had
resulted in the placement of all officers on modest salaries. Whereas
officers in the colonial and early national periods were rewarded with
performance bonuses, American officers of the early twentieth century
were expected to serve for love of country, not for profit.39 It was into the
military culture that had been created by these reformers that Berle and
Means were inducted in 1917. In our view, the service-before-self culture
of the U.S. officer corps of the First World War era shaped the thinking of
Berle and Means about the social responsibilities of business executives.
III. THE BACKGROUND OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
The radicalism of the 1932 book by Berle and Means becomes
evident when compared against either the shareholder-centric theory that
34. ENOCH HERBERT CROWDER, THE SPIRIT OF SELECTIVE SERVICE 48 (1920).
35. CHRISTOPHER DUFFY, MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THE AGE OF REASON 55–56, 61–63, 224
(2005).
36. ALLAN R. MILLETT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE 134 (2012).
37. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1780–1940, at 318 (2013).
38. CROWDER, supra note 34, at 88–90; DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD
WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 152 (2004).
39. PARRILLO, supra note 37.
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informed the court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., or the
shareholder-centric view of the corporation that has dominated American
managerial practice and corporate law since approximately 1980. We
therefore agree with the view of R. Edward Freeman et al., that Adolf Berle
advanced an important precursor of the stakeholder theory of corporate
governance.40 The communitarian ethos that underpins the stakeholder
model of Berle and Means is seen in their call for a “wholly new concept
of corporate activity” in which “neither the claims of ownership nor those
of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community” in
the making of corporate strategy. They argued that the goals of CEOs and
other senior corporate managers should be to deliver “fair wages, security
to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of
business.” Berle and Means said that this program would inevitably divert
a portion of the wealth created by firms from the shareholders to other
stakeholders. For capitalism to survive and become more humane, it was
essential that “the interests of passive property owners” (i.e., shareholders)
should “give way” to the moral “claims by various groups in the
community.”41
It is tempting to attribute the radicalism of this book to the fact it was
released in early 1933 (the very trough of the Great Depression) when
unemployment was at record levels, industry was paralyzed, and it
appeared that the survival of capitalism itself was in doubt.42 However, we
should remember that Berle and Means wrote the manuscript of The
Modern Corporation and Private Property well before this point, in the
period 1927 to 1931.43 As late as the end of 1930, many observers still
thought that the recent Wall Street equities crash would have a limited
impact on the real economy, a widespread and false belief made possible
by the poor state of macroeconomic data in that era.44 Until the
Kreditanstalt crisis of May 1931, it was not clear to contemporaries that
the United States was heading for a severe crisis rather than simply a mild
recession.45 Thus, when Berle and Means were composing their book, the
country had not yet reached a crisis that undermined the legitimacy of
capitalism itself.
40. R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 50 (2010).
41. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 356 (Macmillan 1933) (1932).
42. ERIC RAUCHWAY, THE MONEY MAKERS: HOW ROOSEVELT AND KEYNES ENDED THE
DEPRESSION, DEFEATED FASCISM, AND SECURED A PROSPEROUS PEACE 32 (2015).
43. JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 55–
58 (1987).
44. DIANE COYLE, GDP: A BRIEF BUT AFFECTIONATE HISTORY 13 (2014); WALTER FRIEDMAN,
FORTUNE TELLERS: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST ECONOMIC FORECASTERS 193 (2013).
45. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867–1960, at 333 (1963).
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Rather than seeing the book as primarily a response to the Crash of
1929, we argue that the thinking of Berle and Means was profoundly
influenced by the militarization of U.S. society during the Great War;
indeed, the co-authors first met during their basic military training in
1917.46 As Capozzola has noted, World War I had a profound impact on
American culture and thinking about the nature of the individual’s
obligation to the collective: the 1917 Selective Service Act was the
“centerpiece” of obligations associated with citizenship during wartime.47
In 1916, the United States, which had traditionally spent little on its
military relative to other Western countries,48 suddenly began allocating
massive resources to the military, paving the way for the nation’s eventual
transformation into a military superpower. By many metrics, the United
States in 1914 was a relatively demilitarized society, at least in comparison
to the European states, but within a few years, the armed forces had
developed a pervasive role in national life that endures to this day.49 As
we show below, military themes run through their 1933 magnum opus as
Berle and Means attempted to extend to the business world the ethos of
professionalism and disinterested public service that had earlier come to
inform the thinking of members of the United States Army officer corps.
Khurana argues that the managerialist philosophy that animated
Berle and Means and other early twentieth century American business
reformers and educators was deeply rooted in two American institutions:
the socially reformist version of Christianity taught in the mainline
Protestant denominations and the U.S. military.50 According to Khurana,
a variant of liberal Protestantism later drove some Progressives to seek to
replace the chaos of the unregulated market with a social order in which
disinterested experts such as medical doctors and civil servants displaced
the profit-motive in the allocation of scarce resources. This elitist and
utopian ideology, which was connected to movements such as Prohibition
and eugenics, informed the creation of the Harvard Business School (HBS)
in 1908 and the move to make management into a profession, curated by
insider gatekeepers, similar to medicine and the law. In 1926, HBS Dean
Wallace B. Donham declared that the aim of the school was to produce a

46. Columbia Oral History, supra note 12, at 119.
47. CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 21 (2008).
48. ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
ANTIMILITARIST TRADITION 172 (1956).
49. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 22, 79–81, 129–30 (1987).
50. RAKESH KHURANA, supra note 9, at 296–98.
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generation of socially minded business men who would reform American
capitalism from within corporations.51
Khurana also compares the ideologies that have been taught in elite
U.S. business schools in various historical periods with the professional
ethos that has consistently been cultivated by West Point since 1802. In
the officer corps of the United States and other modern nation-states,
honor is defined in relation to public service. While not necessarily anticommercial, this military ethos is radically non-commercial.52 It is,
therefore, diametrically opposed to the rational-actor model and agency
theory, the theories of human behavior that have been dominant in
business schools since the late 1970s.53 Army officers who dedicate
themselves to the profession of arms do not do so for material reasons.54
For instance, there are no cash performance bonuses or stock options for
dragging a wounded comrade to safety. Instead, in modern, post-French
Revolution armed forces, non-financial rewards such as the Iron Cross, the
Victoria Cross, and Congressional Medal of Honor shape the culture of
the military.55
Our reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Property has
not revealed the impress of the liberal Protestant ideas discussed by
Khurana. However, we do find references to war, particularly the legacies
of the First World War, in this text. In many ways, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property can be viewed as an example of a postwar work written by authors whose lives were transformed by the Great
War. The variant of the stakeholder model of capitalism advocated by
Berle and Means was congruent with the modern military ethos because it
held that the key decision-makers in business organizations should be
motivated by the public interest, not personal financial gain.
IV. THE MAKING OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
Born in 1895, Berle completed A.B. and M.A. degrees at Harvard
College before entering Harvard Law School in 1914. The United States
did not enter the war until April 1917, but American society was divided
by the war as soon as it started in August 1914. These divisions were
partially ethnic, with many German- and Irish-Americans opposing
American entry into the conflict, but the divisions were also related to
51. Id. at 116.
52. Christopher Coker, Outsourcing War, 13 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 95, 102 (1999).
53. Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good Management Practices,
ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 4, 80 (2005).
54. SAM C. SARKESIAN & ROBERT E. CONNOR, JR., THE US MILITARY PROFESSION INTO THE
21ST CENTURY: WAR, PEACE AND POLITICS 21 (1999).
55. Avant, supra note 33.
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region and social class. While many Anglophile upper-class New
Englanders instinctively favored the British from the outset, Berle, who
was of partly German ancestry, declared that he was indifferent to whether
“the Hohenzollerns” or “the French entrenched interests behind
Clemenceau and so forth were to be the masters of Europe.” Since
“Harvard declared war in 1914, right off the bat,” Berle’s time at college
was “a rather bitter period.” Berle enlisted in 1917 despite his reservations
about President Wilson’s decision to abandon neutrality by declaring war
on Germany. He did his military training in Plattsburg, New York, where
he met Means, his future co-author. The two men ended up sharing a bunk
bed. Gardiner Means came from a broadly similar social background and
was also the son of a minister. Means was intellectually gifted and entered
Harvard when he was eighteen to study chemistry.56
The war interrupted their career plans. The site of their officer
training was culturally significant, as the Plattsburg Barracks were the
epicenter of the so-called “Plattsburg Movement,” a social movement that
had begun in 1912. This movement sought to promote the altruistic moral
ideals associated with military service among American businessmen:
businessmen who were reserve officers would run their companies with
the public interest rather than the profit motive in mind. Private donors
who supported this ideal had funded a training camp for would-be officers
in Plattsburg that was dubbed the “businessmen’s camp.”57 The key idea
among the proponents of the Plattsburg Movement was that modern
America was too selfish, too driven by the profit motive, and that business
leaders needed to give back to the community through unpaid military
service on weekends and during the summer months. In effect, the
Plattsburg Movement was about promoting a non-commercial ethos
among the American business class.
By the time Berle and Means had enlisted, officer-training camps
modelled on Plattsburg had been opened across the United States thanks
to the efforts of General Leonard Wood, a military man with center-left
political views, and former President Theodore Roosevelt. In 1912,
Roosevelt ran for the presidency as a third-party candidate on a so-called
“New Nationalism” platform, which included increased military spending
and a variety of progressive reforms that frightened the pro-business
faction of the Republican Party.58 Wood’s progressive beliefs, which
brought him into conflict with U.S. business interests during the military
56. Columbia Oral History, supra note 12, at 30.
57. JOHN GARRY CLIFFORD, THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS: THE PLATTSBURG TRAINING CAMP
MOVEMENT, 1913–1920, at 92 (2014).
58. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 185 (2009).
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occupation of Cuba, informed his approach to military reform and left a
lasting influence on U.S. Army culture. Today, U.S. military men are often
stereotyped as monolithically pro-business and politically conservative:
Wood and his many allies in the Progressive-era armed forces help us to
refute this common idea, since they advocated government limitations on
the profit-making activities of firms.59
Soon after he was commissioned, Berle was transferred into
Intelligence and served in the Dominican Republic. There, he applied his
legal skills in clearing the land titles for the South Puerto Rico Sugar
Company as part of a wartime effort to increase sugar production for U.S.
consumers. He was then posted to the Versailles Peace Conference where
he joined the American delegation as an aide to his former professor,
Robert Lord of Harvard. Berle’s “worm’s eye view” of the conference had
a profound impact on him. He recounted how he was initially “carried
away” by the idealism of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. At Versailles, Berle
worked on a committee that focused on the new Baltic republics, and this
led him to meet John Maynard Keynes.60
The First World War also expanded the intellectual horizons of
Means. After basic training at Plattsburgh, where he met Berle, Means was
accepted into aeronautics training, but an unfortunate crash ended his
hopes of becoming a pilot. In the immediate postwar period, Means
traveled to Turkey to assist American aid efforts. There, he had the
opportunity to observe how the trade in carpets was conducted in a
radically different cultural context. Means’s interest in the industry was
sparked by his experience in Turkey, where he established a textile
manufacturing company soon after his demobilization.61
After his return to the United States, Berle practiced corporate law,
co-founding his own practice in 1924, and taught finance at HBS from
1925 onward.62 Berle began his teachings by publishing about corporate
governance in Columbia Law Review and Harvard Law Review. His
growing stature as an expert on corporations led the Encyclopaedia
Britannica to ask him in 1928 to write the entry for “Corporation” in a new

59. JACK C. LANE, ARMED PROGRESSIVE: GENERAL LEONARD WOOD 148, 262, 268 (1978). In
her forthcoming study of left-wing factions within the present-day U.S. Armed Forces, the
anthropologist Catherine Lutz has noted that many U.S. military personnel are conscious of the
consistency between the U.S. right’s belief that society benefits when business leaders pursue their
self-interest and the cult of “troop veneration,” which celebrates the public-spirited sacrifice of
soldiers.
60. Columbia Oral History, supra note 12, at 31, 32–35, 40–43.
61. See Michael E. Latham, Means, Gardiner Coit, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (2009), http:
//www.anb.org/view/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e-1400875.
62. Columbia Oral History, supra note 12, at 112–13.
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edition.63 Berle’s ideas about corporate governance were shaped by other
Americans who were interested in limiting what they saw as the excessive
selfishness of current business leaders. Berle’s earliest publications on
corporations had brought him to the attention of William Ripley, the
Harvard economics professor who had published Main Street and Wall
Street in 1927. Ripley had, in turn, been influenced by Louis Brandeis’s
1914 book Other People’s Money and Thorstein Veblen’s 1923 book
Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise. Brandeis was a crusading
lawyer who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Wilson in
1916, while Veblen was an institutional economist whose radical views
had cost him several academic appointments.64
Drawing on the iconoclastic ideas of Veblen and Brandeis as well as
his own research, Ripley identified a huge expansion in both the number
and value of corporations since the outbreak of the First World War.65 In
the 1920s, some progressive businessmen were moving away from
shareholder primacy towards the view that managers ought to consider the
interests of other stakeholders. For instance, this idea was endorsed by
Robert Brookings, a businessman and philanthropist.66 Owen Young, first
chairman of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), said in a 1927 HBS
address, “I hope the day may come when these great business
organizations will truly belong to the men who are giving their lives and
their efforts to them. I care not in what capacity.”67 Berle and Means were
thus part of a community of scholars and practitioners who were interested
in challenging the idea that the primary or sole purpose of a corporation
was to maximize the return on the shareholders’ investment.
Ripley was involved with the Social Science Research Council and
the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation. He helped Berle submit a
proposal to study corporations, which resulted in a $7,000 grant.68 Berle
left his part-time teaching job at Harvard Law School in fall 1927, taking
his grant to Columbia Law School.69 Berle then recruited his Plattsburg
training camp “bunkmate,” Gardiner Means, who was then pursuing a

63. Letter from Walter Pitkin to Adolf Berle (July 2, 1928) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Adolph Berle Papers, Box 10).
64. The influence of Veblen on Berle has been discussed in Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and
Veblen: An Intellectual Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2010).
65. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 16–40 (1927).
66. ROBERT S. BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SIGNIFICANCE 75–80 (1925).
67. Justus D. Doenecke, Young, Owen D., AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (1999),
http://www.anb.org/abstract/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e-0600740
?rskey=J0cIGU&result=1.
68. Columbia Oral History, supra note 12, at 117.
69. Id. at 119.
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Ph.D. at Harvard, as his research assistant.70 The research project, which
took four years to complete (1927 to 1931), culminated in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. Berle said that he felt that Means
should have his name on the title page “because he had contributed so
much.”71
The 1929 Wall Street crash happened partway through Berle’s
research project. Although their offices were uptown at Columbia
University, the business connections of Berle and Means meant that they
were well positioned to observe both Wall Street’s reaction to the crisis
and the ensuing national debate about the social function of corporate
finance. Berle knew that the law firms that served Wall Street companies
had intensely disliked Ripley’s book Main Street and Wall Street. Berle
later recalled the following:
[Established law firms] officially disapproved of it, and officially
said so, but a good many of the men in them came to see me, came to
see Ripley—that’s why he was invited to speak at the State Bar
Association—to say, “Now it seems you have a point.” And some of
them went as far as saying, “There is going to be a smash up here.
Something has got to give. This has become far too dangerous
[activity on Wall Street] for serious people.”72

The initial reaction of Wall Street to the ideas of Berle and Means
were also primarily negative. The Corporation Trust Company, founded
in 1892, owned the Commerce Clearing House, which published a range
of business books. Speaking in 1969, Berle recalled that the Corporation
Trust Company attempted to force their book’s original publisher, the
Commerce Clearing House of Chicago, to “find some way of dumping it
quietly.”73 He added that “it therefore came just this side of being
suppressed by the then existent financial establishment.” Berle also
recalled in 1969 that “though we didn’t know it then, we were pounding
out the principles which later became principles on which the Securities
and Exchange Legislation enforced today is based.”74 An unnamed
individual at GM—perhaps chairman Alfred Sloan—read a summary of
The Modern Corporation and Private Property and was deeply
offended.75 The Corporation Trust Company, fearing the loss of GM’s
business, attempted to suppress the book. Luckily for Berle and Means,
70. Id. at 120.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id. at 124.
74. Id.
75. DAVID FARBER, SLOAN RULES: ALFRED P. SLOAN AND THE TRIUMPH OF GENERAL MOTORS
(2002); Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 273, 280 (1983).
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the staff of the Commerce Clearing House did not destroy the publishing
plates and instead sold them to Macmillan and Company, which republished the book in February 1933.76
The Modern Corporation and Private Property may have infuriated
many on Wall Street, but it was critically praised within the academic
community. The political scientist George Ward Stocking wrote that Berle
and Means had “rendered a service to the science of economics which no
economist can afford to overlook.”77 The book raised Berle’s profile,
bringing him into contact with New York State Governor Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR), who was just about to become President. There is no
archival evidence that FDR personally read The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.78 Nonetheless, Berle became part of FDR’s brain trust
and provided the President with advice about finance and banking
reform.79 Berle also advised FDR’s Labor Secretary, Frances Perkins.80
Means’s contribution to the New Deal came largely as a result of his
work as an advisor to Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace, the most
left-wing of FDR’s cabinet members. In 1936, Means published The
Modern Economy in Action, a book co-authored with his wife, the
historian Caroline F. Ware. This work, which distinguished the “new
economy” dominated by large corporations from the “old economy” based
on free enterprise, reiterated the argument of Berle and Means, that the rise
of the large corporation had represented a revolutionary change in the U.S.
economy. As the Second World War approached, Berle and Means
continued to work in public service, although their focus shifted to foreign
policy. As Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs from
1938 to 1944, Berle was one of the architects of FDR’s “Good Neighbor
Policy,” a diplomatic effort aimed at securing the support of Latin
American nations by distancing the U.S. government from the excesses
perpetrated by U.S. corporate interests in the region.81
Under previous Republican administrations, the U.S. government
had largely been seen as the tool of U.S. firms, such as United Fruit. Berle
believed that restraining U.S. firms rather than championing their interests
in all cases would best secure the long-term interests of the United States
76. We have cited page numbers in the 1933 version of the book.
77. George W. Stocking, The Modern Corporation and Private Property by A.A. Berle Jr., and
Gardiner C. Means, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1933, at 214 (book review).
78. THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR
LEGACIES, 1933–1993, at 16 (1997).
79. Letters from Franklin Roosevelt to Adolf Berle (Apr. 23, 1934 & Sept. 13, 1934) (on file
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, Box 10, File: Roosevelt,
Franklin D).
80. Letter from Adolf Berle to Frances Perkins (Mar. 22, 1934) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, File: Pa–Ph).
81. CAROLINE WARE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN ECONOMY IN ACTION 141 (1936).

2019]

Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model

553

and its corporations. Berle’s approach to foreign policy was thus congruent
with his support of the domestic policies associated with the New Deal.
During, and immediately after the Second World War, Berle worked with
likeminded liberal internationalists, such as Dean Acheson, to reshape
U.S. foreign policy in keeping with this theory of enlightened self-interest.
As an elder statesman, Berle advised President Kennedy about U.S. policy
in the region, again urging a policy of enlightened self-interest in which
the U.S. government would sacrifice the short-term needs of particular
corporate interests to win the hearts and minds in the region.82
Means also served in Washington during the New Deal and wartime
eras. He worked as an advisor to Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace
and a variety of federal agencies before leaving the Government to do
research for the Committee for Economic Development. After 1952,
Means worked for the Fund for the Republic, a left-leaning organization
that provided legal services to the targets of McCarthyism, which had
received financial backing from Henry Ford II and other progressive
businessmen.83
V. EVIDENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY-DERIVED IDEAS
ON THE THINKING OF BERLE AND MEANS
Our reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Property has
not revealed much evidence of the Social Gospel or liberal Protestant ideas
that Khurana regards as having driven many early twentieth century U.S.
business reformers to try to limit the pursuit of self-interest. Berle and
Means mention religion only three times in the text, and in all of these
instances they do so in the course of analogizing the concentration of
economic power in the hands of unaccountable corporate executives to the
hierarchical power structures of the Catholic Church.84 A particular
comparison was the practice of CEOs handpicking the boards to which
they are nominally subordinate to “the organization which dominates the
Catholic Church. The Pope selects the Cardinals and the College of
Cardinals in turn select the succeeding Pope.”85 The use of this example
may have been an attempt by the authors to play to the prejudices of
Protestant readers who had been socialized to prefer the more
decentralized, grassroots governance systems of American Protestantism.
Beyond that, however, we find no explicit references or even allusions to
82. KYLE LONGLEY, IN THE EAGLE’S SHADOW: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 175–
76 (2002).
83. See WARREN J. SAMUELS & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, GARDINER C. MEANS, INSTITUTIONALIST
AND POST KEYNESIAN (1990).
84. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 88, 352, 357.
85. Id. at 88.
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religious themes in the book. The authors neither refer to those sections of
the New Testament that condemn avarice or the profit motive nor cite
Walter Rauschenbusch and the other Social Gospel theologians who had
used these passages to argue for socialist policies.86 The Modern
Corporation and Private Property is an essentially secular book, albeit
one with an ethos that is congruent with the Social Gospel.
In our view, the influence of war and militarization on this text is
much greater than that of religion. At the start of the book, Berle and
Means cite Die Neue Wirtschaft, a 1918 essay by Walther Rathenau
(1867–1922), a German business executive of center-left political leanings
who believed that Germany’s capitalism should be improved by giving
workers a voice in corporate governance so that managers would consider
workers’ interests rather than just those of shareholders.87 From 1915,
Rathenau served as chairman of the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft
(AG), the electrical goods firms his father had founded; a position that
allowed him to play an important role in Germany’s war effort and the
political transformation that followed the Kaiser’s abdication. Rathenau,
who strived to create a social-democratic and republican Germany, was
assassinated in 1922 by right-wing German nationalists who wrongly
assumed that his Jewishness meant that he sympathized with the new
Bolshevik regime in Russia.88 In their conclusion, Berle and Means discuss
Rathenau’s late-1918 book Von Kommenden Dingen,89 where Rathenau
argued that managers should liberate them from the control of
shareholders, which would thus allow them to share profits with workers.90
Rathenau’s writings on the future of capitalism, which were shaped
by his wartime experiences, influenced Berle and Means. Berle and Means
were, like Rathenau, attempting to understand how the First World War
had transformed capitalism while simultaneously thinking about how it
could be reformed into a more humane and just system. The First World
War and its socioeconomic impact is a major theme in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. Although the authors discuss the U.S.
Civil War, which they appear to regard as a turning point in business
history,91 they are more interested in the legacies of the First World War
86. While it was largely devoid of religious ideas, the book by Berle and Means was indirectly
connected to the Social Gospel movement in that members of the Rockefeller family financially
supported both. For John D. Rockefeller’s patronage of Social Gospel theologians, see CHRISTOPHER
H. EVANS, THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN AMERICAN RELIGION: A HISTORY 80, 84, 128 (2017).
87. See generally SHULAMIT VOLKOV, WALTHER RATHENAU: WEIMAR’S FALLEN STATESMAN
(2012).
88. Id.
89. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 352.
90. WALTER RATHENAU, VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN 150 (1917).
91. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 12–14.
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and the social and ethical questions it raised. For instance, the authors refer
to the impact of the outbreak of the European war in 1914, which raised
demand for steel on American steel companies, in the course of discussing
the obligation of business executives.92 The authors also discuss how
wealthy Americans attempted to shield their dividend incomes in response
to the “heavy surtaxes on large incomes during the [First World] War and
the post-war period.”93
Berle and Means argue that this war helped to democratize the
ownership of corporate stocks, which previously had been owned by a
small group of wealthy Americans who had come to be much more
dispersed by the conclusion of the conflict in 1919. In their account, the
nature of American capitalism was changed profoundly during the
relatively brief period; the U.S. was a belligerent nation. Although Berle
and Means were open to the possibility that the advent of mass
shareholding during the Great War might be reversed in the future, they
said it was more likely that the wartime dispersal in the ownership of
corporate equity represented a “permanent change in the ownership of
industrial wealth comparable to the shift in landownership which was an
outgrowth of the French Revolution.”94
Berle and Means analogize business activity with military service
while arguing against the “individual liberty” advocated by Adam Smith.
Whereas the enterprises of Smith’s era consisted of “an individual or a few
partners[,] . . . today we have tens and hundreds of thousands of owners,
of workers and of consumers combined in single enterprises.”95 The rise
of these large organizations meant that “individual initiative” would
largely disappear: “[T]he idea that an army operates on the basis of
‘rugged individualism’ would be ludicrous. Equally so is the same idea
with respect to the modern corporation.”96 Berle and Means had realized
that the corporation was not just an economic institution but also a social
one, embodying a wide range of interpersonal relationships contextualized
by power, in a similar fashion to the military.
Neither Berle nor Means was a socialist, and they almost certainly
detested the Bolshevik regime that came to power in late 1917. However,
the analysis of corporate governance in their book was grounded in an
interpretation of history that follows Marxism in holding that conflict
between different layers of societies and organizations is a universal
constant and a primary motor of historical change. They note that the
92. Id. at 323.
93. Id. at 62.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 349.
96. Id.
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current struggle over control of America’s great business corporations is
just the latest iteration of a perennial issue: “a constant warfare has existed
between the individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the
subjects of that power,” with the latter group wanting to ensure that power
is “the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects.”97 It was in that
context that Berle and Means referred to the College of Cardinals in the
Catholic Church.98 In analyzing recent struggles to control U.S.
companies, they used military language and metaphors. For instance,
Berle and Means use words such as “fight,” “battle,” and “open warfare”
when referring to the use of proxy votes in 1929 by John D. Rockefeller,
Jr. to oust Colonel Robert W. Stewart as chairman of Standard Oil
Company of Indiana.99
Although the worldview expressed by Berle and Means in The
Modern Corporation is similar to that of Marxism in that it posits that
social conflict is a universal constant, their approach differs from
Marxism, which issues confident predictions about the future. Berle and
Means evidently disagree with the Marxist concept of historical
inevitability, and as a result, their book is characterized by intellectual
modesty and a sense of historical contingency. Berle and Means confess
that it is not yet clear to them what “position in the community” America’s
“princes of industry” will eventually acquire.100 They note that while other
authors regard the current socioeconomic order “plutocracy” as “a
transition phase towards ultimate socialism or communism,” it was too
soon to venture a firm conclusion about how the existing system would
evolve.101 Similarly, they declare that “it is not possible to predict” with
absolutely certainty that the trend towards corporate concentration would
continue since the annual rate of concentration was varied in recent
years.102 To reinforce their claim that future prediction was challenging,
they point out the concentration rate in “1921 through 1923” slowed,
which may have been “a breathing spell after the excessive growth of the
war years.”103 In other words, the rate of corporate consolidation was not
destined to accelerate forever. However, they are reasonably confident that
“the great corporation, already of tremendous importance today, will
become increasingly important in the future.”104

97. Id. at 353.
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id. at 82.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id.
104. Id.

2019]

Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model

557

The references to the Great War in The Modern Corporation and
Private Property are not surprising, for we know that the conflict did
indeed contribute to the dispersion of share ownership, as Julia Ott has
recently demonstrated.105 During the war, the federal income tax, which
had been introduced in 1913 following the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment, became significantly more progressive.106 To maintain the
support of union leaders such as Samuel L. Gompers for military
conscription, the Wilson administration had agreed to an excess profits tax
that effectively conscripted wealth.107 In the United States, as in wartime
Europe, military conscription on a massive scale resulted in the
introduction of progressive forms of taxation that ensured that older
wealthy men shared the burden with the young and physically fit men who
were compelled to join the military: as Scheve and Stasavage have
observed in their study of Western tax regimes since 1900,108 progressive
taxation and the militarization of societies tends to go hand in hand.
We certainly see this broader pattern at work in the United States
during the First World War, when wartime rhetoric disparaged profitseeking in favor of patriotism. During this conflict, wealthy industrialists
who were too old to serve in uniform agreed to serve in the public sector
as “Dollar-a-Year Men,” while wealthy investors were implored to invest
in low-yield government securities during war bond drives.109 In other
words, the pursuit of economic self-interest was to be suspended for the
duration of hostilities. In discussing the popularity of the service ideal in
this era of American society, David M. Kennedy noted that “few words
were so widely bruited in American society in the World War I era as
‘service’ . . . the wide currency of the term ‘service’ reflected the . . .
historical phase through which American society was then passing.”110
Contemporaries ranging from Walter Lippman to Herbert Hoover believed
that the country was “negotiating a passage between individualistic and
collective era.”111
While U.S. battlefield casualties in the First World War were
relatively light, the economic impact of the war was significant, as
105. JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET 152 (2011).
106. Richard C. Sutch, Financing the Great War: A Class Tax for the Wealthy, Liberty Bonds
for All (Berkeley Econ. History Laboratory, Working Paper No. 2015-09, 2015).
107. John W. Hillje, New York Progressives and the War Revenue Act of 1917, 53 N.Y. HIST.
437 (1972).
108. KENNETH SCHEVE & DAVID STASAVAGE, TAXING THE RICH: A HISTORY OF FISCAL
FAIRNESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 22 (2016).
109. Robert D. Cuff, A “Dollar-a-Year Man” in Government: George N. Peek and the War
Industries Board, 41 BUS. HIST. REV. 404 (1967).
110. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 132–
33, 252–56 (1980).
111. Id. at 153.
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economic historians have demonstrated.112 The transformative impact of
the Great War on American business helps to explain why Berle and
Means discuss this conflict frequently in a book published fourteen years
after the armistice. Furthermore, the war years witnessed Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., in which Ford’s shareholders sued the industrialist on the
grounds of insufficient dividends. This court case, which was discussed in
the book,113 prompted widespread reflection about whether the nonshareholder stakeholders had a moral claim to the share of the profits made
by corporations. Henry Ford had attempted to run his company in keeping
with a variant of a stakeholder theory of corporate governance, albeit one
that saw no role for organized labor. Nevertheless, the courts ruled that
this practice was a breach of Ford’s fiduciary duty to his shareholders.114
VI. THE DECLINING INFLUENCE OF THE BERLE–MEANS VISION
OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP AS PUBLIC SERVICE AFTER 1970
As we have seen, Berle and Means were calling on top managers to
selflessly disregard their pecuniary interests and those of shareholders so
that they could serve a wider range of stakeholders, including workers,
consumers, and crucially, the nation-state. Berle and Means outlined a
vision of corporate governance in which business executives behaved like
the army officers who risk life and limb not for profit but to serve the
national interest. The book by Berle and Means went through many U.S.
editions in the postwar-period, and it also influenced thinking in other
countries via its translations into German, French, Japanese, Italian, and
other languages.115 Moreover, Berle and Means’s vision of business
executives who were motivated by public service rather than simple profit
maximization was echoed by other popular business books of the postwar
era, such as the 1958 bestseller The Capitalist Manifesto by Louis Kelso
and Mortimer Adler, as well as Howard Bowen’s 1953 book The Social
Responsibilities of the Businessman and Morrell Heald’s The Social
Responsibilities of Business, Company, and Community, 1900-1960.116

112. Michael J. Greenwood & Zachary Ward, Immigration Quotas, World War I, and Emigrant
Flows from the United States in the Early 20th Century, EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST., Jan. 2015, at
76; Hugh Rockoff, Until It’s Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10580, 2004).
113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 190, 261.
114. Henderson, supra note 19.
115. Letter from Haruzo Kaneko to Adolf Berle (1951) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, Box 181, File: The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Correspondence, 1949–1970).
116. Stefan J. Padfield, The Inclusive Capitalism Shareholder Proposal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, Berle and Means’s vision influenced the
culture of corporate America: in this period, most managers explicitly
rejected the idea of shareholder primacy and declared their firms existed
to serve a wide range of stakeholders, including workers.117 However,
starting in the 1970s, the political and business cultures of the United
States shifted away from the ethos espoused by Berle and Means. The key
player in the realm of ideas who contributed to this shift was the neoliberal
economist and public intellectual Milton Friedman, who famously
declared that the “one and only one social responsibility of business” was
to maximize profits for shareholders.118 Friedman promoted such
neoliberal ideas in his academic work at the University of Chicago, his
Newsweek column and television documentaries, and in the advice he
gave personally to U.S. Presidents and world leaders.119 The end of the
draft in 1974 was strongly supported by Friedman and other neoliberals
who wanted a more market-oriented approach to military recruitment.120
The neoliberal belief that firms should maximize profits as much as
the law allows is fundamentally similar to the ethos that says that military
service should be structured like any other employment market in which
self-interested, rational actors participate. In both cases, it is assumed that
everyone is self-interested and there are no appeals to patriotism or any
other form of altruism. The end of military conscription, which was a
crucial early victory for the neoliberal project,121 can therefore be linked
to the cultural trends that contributed to the rise of the ideology of
shareholder value in the 1980s and 1990s, a period when U.S. managers
returned to the early twentieth century view that the sole purpose of a
corporation was to promote shareholder value.122 The ideology of
shareholder value was promoted among the U.S. business elite by
Professor Michael Jensen, who joined the faculty of HBS in 1984 and
aggressively promoted this vision of how companies ought to be governed
117. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2.
118. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
119. DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE
BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 173 (2012); PHILIP MIROWSKI & DIETER PLEHWE, THE ROAD FROM
MONT PÈLERIN 167 (2009).
120. Charles Moskos, The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique, in THE ALLVOLUNTEER FORCE AFTER A DECADE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 15–17 (William R. Bowman et
al. eds., 1986).
121. James Burk, The Changing Moral Contract for Military Service, in THE LONG WAR:
AMERICA’S QUEST FOR SECURITY SINCE WORLD WAR II (Andrew Bacevich ed., 2007); Deborah E.
Cowen, Fighting for “Freedom”: The End of the Conscription in the United States and the Neoliberal
Project of Citizenship, 10 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 167 (2006); Ronald R. Krebs, The Citizen-Soldier
Tradition in the United States: Has its Demise Been Greatly Exaggerated?, 36 ARMED FORCES &
SOC’Y 153 (2009).
122. KHURANA, supra note 9; William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder
Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000).
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in his influential publications and the MBA classroom.123Although
influential, Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen promoted ideas that were
diametrically opposed to the citizen–soldier ethos promoted by Berle and
Means.
Another public intellectual who influenced U.S. business culture in
a fashion that undermined the public-service ethos promoted by Berle and
Means was Ayn Rand, a thinker who had a profound impact on U.S.
politics and culture despite never having an institutional affiliation.124
Although only a small minority of business and political leaders have
openly identified themselves as followers of this self-employed
philosopher, her absolutist defense of free markets and the pursuit of selfinterest has had a well-documented influence on U.S. business culture and
on the thinking of U.S. CEOs in industries ranging from energy to retail.125
Prominent CEOs who have acknowledged Rand’s influence on their
thinking include Rex Tillerson of ExxonMobil, Andy Pudzer of the fastfood group CKE Restaurants, and John A. Allison IV, CEO of BB&T and
subsequent head of Washington’s Cato Institute.126 Ayn Rand wrote that
each individual ought to pursue “his own rational self-interest, none
sacrificing himself or others . . . . This is the opposite of what the word
‘service’ means.”127 Although Rand never directly attacked the
publications of Berle and Means, her ideas were clearly incompatible with
their philosophy of corporate governance.
The results of the displacement of the Berle–Means vision of how
companies ought to be governed with Friedman and Jensen’s shareholder
value ideology has produced a range of negative consequences for U.S.
business and society. The adoption by U.S. business leaders of shareholder
value ideology resulted in a wave of ruthless downsizing of the type
pioneered by GE’s Jack Welch, the development of a short-termist
123. DUFF MCDONALD, THE GOLDEN PASSPORT: HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, THE LIMITS OF
CAPITALISM, AND THE MORAL FAILURE OF THE MBA ELITE (2017).
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125. JENNIFER BURNS, GODDESS OF THE MARKET: AYN RAND AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT 297
(2009); Jonathan Freedland, The New Age of Ayn Rand: How She Won Over Trump and Silicon Valley,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/apr/10/new-age-ayn-randconquered-trump-white-house-silicon-valley [https://perma.cc/QCL7-NCZX]; Mina Kimes, At Sears,
Eddie Lampert’s Warring Divisions Model Adds to the Troubles, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2013), http://
www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-07-11/at-sears-eddie-lamperts-warring-divisions-modeladds-to-the-troubles.
126. James Hohmann, Ayn Rand-Acolyte Donald Trump Stacks His Cabinet with Fellow
Objectivists, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
paloma/daily-202/2016/12/13/daily-202-ayn-rand-acolyte-donald-trump-stacks-his-cabinet-withfellow-objectivists/584f5cdfe9b69b36fcfeaf3b/?utm_term=.900c85b70ccb [https://perma.cc/LJB6B26P].
127. Ayn Rand, How Not to Fight Against Socialized Medicine, OBJECTIVIST NEWSL., Feb.
1963.
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approach to corporate decision-making, reduced spending on corporate
R&D, and growing economic inequality both within firms and the wider
society.128
CONCLUSION
We interpret The Modern Corporation and Private Property as an
attempt by the authors to introduce to the business world the ethos of
disinterested public service that characterizes the officer corps of the U.S.
military. In effect, Berle and Means were calling on top managers to
selflessly disregard their pecuniary interests and those of shareholders so
that they could serve a wider range of stakeholders, including workers,
consumers, and, crucially, the nation-state. Berle and Means outlined a
vision of corporate governance in which business executives behaved like
the army officers who risk life and limb not for profit but to serve the
national interest. Our paper has suggested the Berle and Means’s vision of
corporate executives who altruistically serve the national interest was
informed by the example of military officers who patriotically serve the
national interest in return for modest salaries. We would therefore suggest
that the managerialist/stakeholder philosophy of Berle and Means can be
associated with the militarization of U.S. society, a process that
accelerated during the First World War and which had a profound impact
on both of the book’s authors.
The Modern Corporation and Private Property played an important
role in debates about the social purposes of U.S. corporations during and
after the New Deal. As other authors have noted, the public service ethos
that Berle and Means promoted in the book was dominant in U.S. business
culture until about 1980, when a new generation of business leaders and
intellectuals resurrected the idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is
to maximize shareholder value.129 By the 1990s, shareholder value
ideology was hegemonic in U.S. business culture, and it has had a
significant impact on business decision-making.130
However, a single book, no matter how eloquent and thoroughly
researched, cannot shift the business culture of an entire nation. The
research of Cheffins suggests that the ideas of Berle and Means had such
a great influence on U.S. business because they were congruent with the
ethos of public service that was inculcated in U.S. business leaders of the
so-called Greatest Generation during the Second World War. Cheffins’s
insight raises the counterfactual question of whether the ideas of Berle and
128. MARTIN, supra note 1; MCDONALD, supra note 123; Stout, supra note 1; Wells, supra
note 1.
129. Wells, supra note 1.
130. See MCDONALD, supra note 123.
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Means would have resonated with so many U.S. business leaders of the
Greatest Generation had the United States not experienced mass
mobilization, and the associated political and culture transformations, after
1941.131
Some scholars who research economic inequality subscribe to Walter
Scheidel’s theory that economic inequality in capitalist societies is only
likely to fall during and immediately after major war and other
catastrophic episodes of violence.132 The casual mechanism said to link
mass military mobilization and greater economic inequality is that
universal military service is thought to promote norms that encourage the
more egalitarian distribution of wealth.133 Scheidel’s theory is congruent
with the observed behavior of U.S. businesses in the three decades after
1945, when the managers of U.S. corporations allowed workers and other
non-shareholder stakeholders to share in the benefits of rising productivity
to a degree that looks generous in retrospect.134 Combining Scheidel’s
theory with the research presented in this paper helps us to identify a
direction for future research, namely historical research to determine how
precisely the legacies of wartime mobilization interacted with the ideas
presented by Berle and Means to help produce the public-spirited business
culture of the United States in the three decades after 1945. Such research
might involve comparing the words and actions of post-war business
leaders who had served in uniform with those who did not. Another
possible research avenue leading from this paper would be to investigate
the reception of Berle and Means’s book outside of the United States.
We believe that the arguments that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
articulated are still germane to policy discussions. There are, of course,
important differences between the historical context in which this book
was written (i.e., the end of the Roaring Twenties) and the present, and
some striking parallels exist, including high rates of income inequality and
widespread dissatisfaction with the prevailing shareholder-centric theory
of corporate governance. In our view, the relevance of the ideas of Berle
and Means is illustrated by an episode from the 2016 presidential election,
when Hillary Clinton called for more “corporate patriotism.”
Campaigning in Detroit in March 2016, Clinton criticized the outsourcing
of U.S. manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries: “The idea of corporate
patriotism might sound quaint in era of vast multinationals, but it’s the
131. Cheffins, supra note 24, at 717.
132. For a leading example, see generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2013).
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right thing to do.”135 In her speech to the July 2016 Democratic National
Convention, Clinton once again called on American corporations to begin
acting in a more “patriotic” fashion: “I believe American corporations that
have gotten so much from our country should be just as patriotic in
return.”136 In a piece of political theatre, Clinton’s call for a “New
Bargain” between corporations and American workers was delivered after
a series of uniformed military speakers had warmed up the audience. The
juxtaposition of symbols of military service with a discussion of corporate
greed subtly challenged shareholder value ideology, i.e., the view that the
sole purpose of a company is to make money for its worldwide shareholder
base.137
As we have shown, Berle and Means believed that just as male
citizens of a democracy have a duty to perform military service, the
managers of corporations must also seek to promote the commonwealth
rather than exclusively their own interests or those of the shareholders. At
a time when Americans are once again debating issues related to corporate
governance, executive compensation, and whether managers have duties
beyond maximizing returns for shareholders, thinking about the historical
origins of Berle and Means’s text is timely. It may be that Hillary Clinton’s
corporate patriotism concept is resurrected by future political leaders. The
public service ethos that shaped Berle and Means appears to be less
prevalent than it was when The Modern Corporation and Private Property
was published. However, Berle and Means wrote about a problem—
control of corporations—that continues to have enormous public policy
implications. They still have much to contribute to discussions of
corporate power, ownership, and who gets to shape the role of corporations
in society.
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